Cognitive radio (CR) networks allow secondary users (SUs) to access and use the spectrum opportunistically. However, some misbehavior users mislead SUs to evacuate the spectrum by launching a primary user emulation attack (PUEA), which is a denial of service (DoS) attack. During the service of an SU, the arrival of the malicious misbehavior users (MMUs) will force the SU under service to leave the system. Another type of attack, different from the MMU, refers to the selfish misbehavior users (SMUs) who launch PUEA to interrupt the serving SU and then take over the spectrum for their own use. In this paper, we consider two types of misbehavior users, i.e., MMU and SMU. We first investigate the noncooperative behavior of SUs that maximize their own benefit and obtain a unique individual Nash equilibrium joining strategy. Next, we present a socially optimal joining strategy from the perspective of social planners. To eliminate the gap between individual equilibrium and socially optimal strategies, a fee imposed on SUs is proposed. We carry out a sensitivity analysis of joining strategies of SUs and social welfare regarding some main parameters of the system. Interestingly, we observe that the individual equilibrium and socially optimal joining probabilities along with the social welfare increase when the MMUs invade the system more frequently.
I. INTRODUCTION
To overcome spectrum shortage, the concept of cognitive radio networks (CRNs) has been proposed to improve the spectrum utilization by allowing unlicensed users (also called secondary users -SUs) to access the spectrum opportunistically. SUs sense the spectrums and occupy them when some of them are idle. When licensed users (primary users -PUs) request to use the spectrum, SUs will be interrupted and the PU takes the spectrum for use. Therefore PUs have absolutely higher priorities over SUs. However, misbehavior secondary users could exploit this spectrum mechanism and launch primary user emulation attack (PUEA). In such an attack, misbehavior secondary users mislead normal SUs to evacuate the spectrum by launching signals that PUs request to use the spectrum. In this way, misbehavior secondary users can use the spectrum and normal SUs quit the band unnecessarily.
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In general, there are two types of misbehavior secondary users, i.e., malicious misbehavior users (MMUs) and selfish misbehavior users (SMUs). MMUs launch PUEA to make SUs unable to use the available band, and have to frequently switch or leave the system eventually. Their main purpose is to destroy normal transmission of the system. For SMUs, they behave like normal SUs, while the difference is that they launch PUEA to obtain a higher priority to use the spectrum. As a result, the SMUs will increase the blocking rate and the interruption rate of SUs.
Most of existing literature considered detection and mitigation of PUEA ([1]- [11] ). Das and Das [12] , Singh and Shama [13] listed existing security threats and summarized techniques to identify and mitigate PUEA. Markov chain method has been applied to analyze the systems and to derive performance of the CR system under PUEA. For instance, Jin et al. [14] developed a three dimensional continuous time Markov chain (3D-CTMC) to model the system under PUEA and they obtained the blocking rate and dropping rate of SUs. Subsequently, Jin et al. [15] continued to study the impact of PUEA on blocking rate and dropping rate of SUs. Zhang et al. [16] also used Markov chain to model a CR system, and Ma et al. [17] proposed an M /M /c/k 1 /k 2 queueing system to investigate the impact of greedy SUs on waiting time.
In this paper, we mainly consider the behavior of SUs in CR systems from a game-theoretic viewpoint. In literature, there are some work that studied SUs strategic behavior and presented some managerial insight. For example, Do et al. [18] modeled the CR system as an M/M/1 queue and studied SUs' strategic behavior. Jagannathan et al. [19] considered a noncooperative game among SUs and derived the Nash equilibrium strategy. Wang and Li [21] used an M/M/1 retrial queue to model the CR system and studied cooperative and noncooperative game among SUs. Besides, some literature considered heterogenous SUs and analyzed their behavior, such as heterogenous delay cost [20] - [22] , heterogenous reward [23] . Various queueing models applied in CR systems are reviewed and concluded in [24] .
Extensive research on PUEA issue in CRNs considered how to detect and mitigate PUEA, or to explore the impact of PUEA on the CR system. Although commonly observed in optimal control of CRNs, secondary users' joining behavior with PUEAs has not been explored in the literature to the best of our knowledge. In this paper, we first study the behavior of SUs from the queueing-game-theoretic viewpoint. Different from previous work, we consider the impact of the concurrent existence of SMU and MMU on SUs' joining strategy in the CR system by formulating it as an M/M/1 type queueing game problem. Accordingly, both the noncooperative and cooperative cases are considered from the perspective of individuals and social planners.
To summarize, our contributions are presented as follows: (1) We study the behavior of SUs with the concurrent existence of SMU and MMU in the CR system from the queueing-game-theoretic viewpoint for the first time.
(2) The equilibrium and socially optimal joining strategies are obtained explicitly. As intuitively expected, the socially optimal joining probability is always less than the equilibrium joining probability. To eliminate the difference, we propose that an admission fee should be imposed on SUs.
(3) Interestingly, we observe that the individual equilibrium joining probability, the socially optimal joining probability and the social welfare increase when the arrival rate of the MMUs increases.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we present the model description. Section III shows the steady-state probabilities and derives the expected waiting time of SUs. Based on these results in Section III, SUs' individual equilibrium joining strategy and socially optimal joining strategy are presented in Section IV and Section V, respectively. Numerical experiments are presented in Section VII. Section VIII concludes this paper.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
We study a CR system with a single PU band. There are two types of misbehavior secondary users. This PU band can be regarded as a server that aims to serve all arriving requests of a single PU and SUs. In our model we assume that SUs arrive according to a Poisson process at rate λ su , and their service times are exponentially distributed with rate µ. SUs will be served if the server is idle. During the service period of SUs, there might be arrivals of misbehavior secondary users. We consider two types of misbehavior secondary users, MMU and SMU. If an SMU arrives and launches PUEA during service period of SUs, the band will be occupied by the SMU. After service completion of the SMU, the server continues to serve the interrupted SU. If an MMU arrives and launches PUEA, the serving SU or SMU will be forced to leave the system and the server will serve the MMU immediately. According to the related literature, misbehavior users can hardly launch PUEA singly and they usually adopt some coordination mechanisms to launch PUEA [1] , [6] . In this paper, we assume that interarrival times of the MMUs and the SMUs are exponentially distributed with mean 1/λ sa and 1/λ ma , and their occupation times are exponentially distributed at rate α and β, respectively. When the PU arrives if the PU band is occupied by SUs or misbehavior users, the server stops to serve PU. Occupation times of the PU follow an i.i.d exponential distribution with mean 1/γ . Interarrival times of PU are also exponentially distributed at rate λ pu .
Here we assume that SUs have no information about the state of the PU band and numbers of SUs in waiting line. Upon arrival, SUs decide whether to use the band or not. If an SU decides to use the PU band, he leaves the system in two ways, service completion or forced departure due to arrivals of the MMU during his service period. Thus we assume SUs receive a reward of R s if they leave the system due to service completion, or a compensation of R f if they are forced to depart. Here we assume R s ≥ R f . When SUs wait in the system, they incur a waiting cost of c per time unit.
Let I (t) be the state of the PU band at time t. The event I (t) = 0 corresponds to that the band is available to SUs, and the events I (t) = 1, 2, 3 represent that the band is occupied by the PU, SMU and MMU, respectively. Define N (t) as the number of SUs in the system. Therefore, the stochastic process {(I (t), N (t)), t ≥ 0} is a 2-D Markov chain with state space {0, 1, 2, 3}×{0, 1, 2, . . .}. In our model we assume that the PU band is unobservable by homogenous SUs, thus, they will adopt a mixed strategy, that is "use the PU band with probability q, and balk with probability 1 − q". Therefore corresponding effective arrival rate is λ su q. Finally, Figure 1 presents access process of SUs and notations are summarized in Table 1 .
The situation among SUs can be considered as a symmetric game due to homogeneity. Let F(q,q) be the utility function of an SU who selects the strategy q ∈ [0, 1] given that others follow strategyq ∈ [0, 1]. A strategy q * is said to be a Nash equilibrium strategy if no one wants to deviate it, that is,
We assume that all SUs are risk neutral. In the following, we pay attention to SUs' strategic behavior. We consider that SU are noncooperative and cooperative, respectively. In the first case, SUs make their decisions to maximize their own benefit, and we aim to derive the Nash equilibrium strategy. In the last case, SUs cooperate to maximize their total benefit and we will give their socially optimal strategy.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SYSTEM
Before analyzing SUs' strategic behavior, we first study system's characteristics given that SUs follow strategy (q, 1−q), where q is SUs' joining probability. Denote by p(i, j) steadystate probability that the system is at state (i, j). Then we have the following Kolmogorov equations:
To compute the expected number of SUs, we first define partial generating function as follows,
Next proposition shows the steady-state probabilities and the expected numbers of SUs in the system when the band is occupied by the PU, SUs, the MMU and the SMU.
Proposition 1: In a CR system with two types of misbehavior users, in which SUs join the system with probability q, the probabilities that the PU band is using by the PU, SUs, the MMU and the SMU are
The expected numbers of SUs in the system when the PU band is used by the PU, SUs, the MMU and the SMU are given in (13)- (16) , as shown at the bottom of this page.
Proof: Multiplying (1)-(8) by z i , and summing over i, we obtain
Solving the above equations, we have (17)- (20) , as shown at the bottom of the next page. Let z → 1, we derive that
We find that p 1 (1), p 2 (1), p 3 (1) can be expressed by p 0 (1). Then we can give the expression of p 0 (1) as showed in (9) by using normalization condition p 0 (1) + p 1 (1) + p 2 (1) + p 3 (1) = 1. Putting (9) into (21)-(23), we obtain the p 1 (1), p 2 (1) and p 3 (1) .
Differentiating (17)- (20) and letting z = 1 yield N 0 = p 0 (1), N 1 = p 0 (1), N 2 = p 0 (1) and N 3 = p 0 (1). We note that N 1 , N 2 and N 3 are expressed by p 0 (1), N 0 , and p(0, 0). Since p 0 (1) and N 0 are given in (9) and (13), and p(0, 0) can be obtained by combining (9) and the following equations
we can give the mean numbers of SUs in the system when the band is occupied by the PU, SUs, the MMU and the SMU, respectively.
IV. NONCOOPERATIVE STRATEGY
For selfish SUs, their aim is to maximize their benefit by adopting an optimal joining strategy q. Upon arrivals, they evaluate their expected waiting cost and expected reward and then make their joining/balking decisions. Naturally, they prefer to enter the system if their reward exceeds cost. If their reward is equal to waiting cost, it's indifferent for them between joining or balking. For each SU, his behavior is influenced by other SUs because system's performance is effected by other SUs' decisions, which results in a noncooperative game among SUs. Our goal is to find the Nash equilibrium strategy of selfish SUs. Before analyzing SUs' equilibrium strategy, we first give their utility function. As mentioned in model description,
where
SUs' utility function is consist of two parts, reward and waiting cost.
The serving SU has two ways to leave the system. One is departing the system when his service is finished. The other is abandoning the system when the MMU arrives. Define P s as the probability that the serving SU leaves the system due to service completion. For the tagged SU, he leaves the system due to service completion if and only if the MMU doesn't arrive the system during his service period. Since the SU's service time and interarrival time of the MMU are exponentially distributed with rate µ and λ ma respectively, then
where X s and X m are exponentially distributed random variables with rate µ and λ ma . Then SUs' expected reward is
Next we focus on SUs' waiting cost.
The following proposition shows the explicit expression of waiting time of SUs.
Proposition 2: In a CR system under PUEA, for an arriving SU who decides to enter the system, his expected waiting time is
. Moreover, the expected waiting time is increasing in q.
Proof: Homogenous SUs can't observe the state of the PU band and the number of SUs in the waiting line. Thus they adopt a mixed strategy (q, 1 − q) where q is their joining probability. Then the effective arrival rate of SUs is λ su q. The mean number of SUs in CR system can be calculated by
According to Little's law, the expected waiting time of SUs is given as follows:
Since ∂T (q) ∂q > 0, the expected waiting time of SUs is increasing in q.
Based on the reward-cost structure, SUs' utility function is
U (q) decreases with q since T (q) is increasing in q as stated in Proposition 2. Now we are ready to analyze SUs' strategic behavior and provide their Nash equilibrium strategy. The following proposition shows SUs' Nash equilibrium strategy.
Proposition 3: In a CR system under PUEA, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium strategy ''join with probability q e '', where
and q ee is given in (28), as shown at the bottom of this page.
Proof: We already give SUs' utility function in (24) , and U (q) is decreasing in q ∈ [0, 1]. Then we have following cases:
. When others balk, the tagged SU receives a negative benefit. Thus his best response is balking. Then q e = 0 is the Nash equilibrium strategy. (1) . In this case, we can find a unique Nash equilibrium solution q ee ∈ [0, 1], which can be derived by solving equation U (q ee ) = 0. (1) . When others decide to join the system, the tagged SU also prefers to enter the system since he receives a positive benefit. Thus, q e = 1 is a Nash equilibrium strategy. We complete the proof.
Since U (q) decreases with q, an arriving SU receives positive benefit and decides to join the system given that other SUs follow a strategy q(< q e ). Thus his best response is to adopt the strategy q = 1. On the other hand, if other SUs adopt a strategy q(> q e ), his best response is balking, since he will receive a negative benefit if he joins. Furthermore, it is indifferent for him between entering or balking when others follow strategy q = q e . Based on the above analysis, we find that when others are more willing to join the system, the SU has lower interest to the system. This phenomenon is "avoid the crowed"(ATC).
V. COOPERATIVE STRATEGY
In this section, we turn our interest to cooperative case. Different from the noncooperative case, SUs cooperate with each other and try to find the optimal spectrum access strategy in this case. Therefore, SUs aim to find an optimal strategy to maximize the social welfare which is equal to their total benefit. Given that SUs adopt a mixed strategy q, the social welfare is
where λ su q is effective arrival rate and N (q) is the mean number of SUs in the CR system. Thus, SUs aim to find an optimal q to maximize S(q). Next proposition presents socially optimal joining strategy. Proposition 4: In a CR system under PUEA, there exists a unique socially optimal strategy "join with probability q s ", where
and q ss is given in (29), as shown at the bottom of this page. Proof: Total benefit of SUs is given in (24), then we will find an optimal joining strategy q to maximize S(q). Differentiating S(q), we obtain
Since ∂T (q) ∂q > 0 and ∂ 2 T (q) ∂q 2 > 0, we have ∂ 2 S(q) ∂q 2 < 0 which follows that ∂S(q) ∂q is decreasing in q ∈ [0, 1]. Then we have following three cases:
. In this case, we have ∂S(q) ∂q < 0 which implies that S(q) is decreasing in q. Thus q s = 0 is the socially optimal strategy. (1) . In this case, S(q) is increasing and then decreasing. Thus the socially optimal strategy is the solution of equation S (q) = 0. (1) . In this case, the social welfare is increasing in q since S (q) > 0. Thus the socially optimal joining probability is 1. We complete the proof.
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VI. ADMISSION FEE
Now we have derived SUs' individual equilibrium strategy and socially optimal strategy, and find that they are quite different, which means that social welfare optimization can't be reached by self-interested SUs. For social planners, they need to find a way to make self-interested SUs behave in socially optimal manner. Before we discuss how to induce behavior of selfish SUs, we first compare individual equilibrium strategy q e and socially optimal strategy q s . Proposition 5: In a CR system under PUEA, the socially optimal joining probability q s is not greater than individual equilibrium joining probability q e .
Proof: The expressions of individual equilibrium strategy q e and socially optimal strategy q s are given in (25) and (27). We next compare q e and q s in following circumstances:
• When T (0) ≤ µR s +λ ma R f c(µ+λ ma ) ≤ T (1), q s = q ss and q e = q ee . Since T (q) > 0, we have
. We know that q ee is the root of equation
− cT (q) = 0, and q ss is the root of equation
Thus we have q s = q ss ≤ q ee = q e . We complete the proof.
Proposition 5 tells us that individual equilibrium joining probability is not the best solution to meet social welfare optimization. The reason is that selfish SUs only care about their own benefit and ignore the negative externalities imposing on other SUs. Thus, the band is overused by those selfish SUs. However, for social planners who want to maximize social welfare, they need to consider negative externalities. Therefore, when SUs are cooperative, there are less SUs to decide to use the PU band.
To induce selfish SUs to behave in the way that social planners want, service provider can charge a fee p to SUs who decide to use the band. Then the reward of SUs that decide to use the band reduces to R s P s +R f (1−P s )−p. As a result, SUs will show less interest to the band. The following proposition gives the fee p.
Proposition 6: In a CR system under PUEA, to achieve the balance of the individual equilibrium joining strategy and the social welfare maximization, an admission fee should be imposed on SUs. The optimal admission fee p * is given by
where q ss is given by (29).
Proof: Imposing fee on SUs decreases their reward from µR s +λ ma R f µ+λ ma to µR s +λ ma R f µ+λ ma − p. Accordingly, the equilibrium joining probability is
In the case of µR s +λ ma R f c(µ+λ ma ) < T (0), the socially optimal joining probability is 0, which is equal to individual equilibrium probability. Thus, in this case, imposing fee is unnecessary since social welfare under the social optimization is equal to that under the individual equilibrium.
When µR s +λ ma R f c(µ+λ ma ) > T (1) + T (1), the socially optimal strategy is that all SUs decide to join. We let p = cT (1), then we derive
> T (1), which follows that SUs' joining probability is 1 in equilibrium. Thus, in this case, when social planners impose fee p = cT (1), SUs decide to join the system, and social welfare under the social optimization is equal to that under the individual equilibrium.
Finally, we consider the case T (0) ≤ µR s +λ ma R f c(µ+λ ma ) ≤ T (1) + T (1). In this case, we let q ee = q ss and p = ≤ T (1) which is second case in (31). As a result, the joining probability in equilibrium is coincident with the socially optimal joining probability.
We complete the proof.
Here imposing a fee on SUs do not change total welfare. This is because this fee is an internal transfer value from SUs to service providers of the system. By charging the fee, SUs behave in the socially optimal way. Remark 1: It should be noted that Do et al. [18] studied SUs' strategic behavior in CR system without PUEA. In fact, by letting λ ma = 0 and λ sa = 0 in our model, all results in our paper are the same as counterparts in [18] . In this sense, [18] is a special case of our work.
VII. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we first examine the impact of system's parameters on the joining strategies of SUs and social welfare, and then compare our system with the system without PUEA to explore the impact of PUEA on SUs' joining strategies.
A. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
As shown in Figure 2 -7, we first investigate sensitivity analysis of SUs' individual equilibrium and socially optimal joining probabilities within changing of R s , R f , µ, λ su , λ ma and λ sa . We find that q e is always less than q s , which coincides with the result in Theorem 5. In Figures 2 and 3 , q e and q s are both increasing in R s and R f . It is intuitive to understand this finding. When R s (or R f ) increases, SUs receive more reward which follows that they prefer to use the PU band. Figure 4 presents that joining probabilities increase with µ. The reason is that when µ increases, the server serves SUs more faster, which reduces their waiting cost. Therefore, joining probabilities increase regardless of whether they are cooperative or noncooperative. As shown in Figure 4 and 8, SU's joining probabilities are decreasing in λ su and λ sa . Since increasing arrival rate of SUs and SMU will make the system crowded and blocked, SUs prefer to balk to maximize their benefit.
Intuitively, when the MMU launches PUE attack more frequently, SUs will have more probability to force to leave the system and receive compensation R f rather than reward R s . Thus they prefer to balk. Surprisingly, Figure 7 shows that arriving SUs are inclined to use the PU band. It can be interpreted as follows. Frequent PUEA from the MMU will make the serving SU leave the system, which significantly reduces the waiting time of an arriving SU. As a result, arriving SUs still want to use the PU band. In Figure 8-12 , we next present the sensitivity analysis of social welfare with respect to system's parameters. Figure 8 and 9 show that social welfare increases with R f and R s and decreases with c as we expect. It is observed that social welfare is decreasing in λ sa and increasing in α in Figure 10 . When λ sa increases, the system will be attacked more frequently which means that SUs' requests will be blocked more easily. Thus, their waiting cost will increase. At the same time, Figure 6 shows that SU's joining probabilities decrease when λ sa increases. As a result, social welfare decreases. In Figure 11 , it's readily seen that social welfare is first increasing and then decreasing in λ pu . The reason is that when λ pu is small, the arrival of the PU will make the SMU and MMU leave the system which eases congestion of the system caused by the SMU and the MMU. SUs will have more chance to be served. As a result, their waiting cost decreases. Therefore, social welfare increases. On the other hand, when λ pu is large, although frequent arrivals of the PU will make the MMU and the SMU leave the system and ease the congestion, it will also frequently interrupt SUs which means that SUs need more time to be served. It follows the decrease of social welfare. Moreover, with the increase of γ , the social welfare is also increasing. The reason is that the increase of service rate γ reduces the time that the PU occupies the band which improves the efficiency of the system. Then SUs have more opportunities to access the spectrum. Thus SUs' waiting time decreases and social welfare increases. With regard to λ ma and β in Figure 12 , social welfare is increasing. When λ ma increases, SUs' joining probabilities increase as showed in Figure 7 . Meanwhile, for an arriving SU, arrivals of the MMU can reduce his waiting time since the MMU launches PUEA and causes leaving of the serving SU. Therefore, social welfare increases. On the other hand, the increase of β reduces the time that the MMU occupies the band. Thus SUs have more chance to use the band which improves social welfare.
B. THE IMPACT OF PUEA
In this section, we explore the impact of PUEA on the behavior of SUs. First, letting λ ma = 0 and λ sa = 0, we derive the equilibrium joining probability q c e and socially optimal joining probability q c s without PUEA as follow: which are coincident with the results in [18] . Then in Figure 13 , we compare q c e , q c s , q e , q s . We observe that q c e > q c s and q e > q s always hold. This is the result that we have presented in Proposition 5. Intuitively, SUs receive less benefit in a CR system without PUEA. However we find that q e > q c e and q s > q c s when λ ma is large. In other words, SUs show less interest when there is no PUEA. It can be interpreted as follow. When an MMU launches PUEA, the serving SU or SMU will be forced to leave the system. For an arriving SU, this can reduce his waiting time. Therefore, compared with the system without PUEA, SUs are more willing to join the system with PUEA. FIGURE 13. Comparison between the system under PUEA and the system without PUEA versus λ ma for R s = 7, R f = 3, c = 1, µ = 5, λ su = 3, λ pu = 8, γ = 4, λ sa = 8, α = 5, β = 1.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In practice, PUEA could be launched by two types of misbehavior users (MMU and SMU). The aim of the MMU is to destroy normal transmission of SUs, while SMU interrupts the serving SU and occupies the spectrum like other SUs. This paper studied SUs' strategic behavior in CR system with PUEA from the game-theoretic viewpoint for the first time. The noncooperative case where SUs are self-interested and make decisions to maximize their own benefit was investigated and we obtained the unique individual equilibrium joining strategy. From the perspective of social planners, the cooperative case was also studied. We derived the socially optimal joining strategy and found that the socially optimal joining probability is always less than the counterpart in equilibrium. To induce SUs to behave in socially optimal manner, a fee should be imposed on SUs, which can eliminate the gap between individual equilibrium and social optimization.
Some interesting results revealed the managerial insight in practice.
